The psychometric study of risk perception by Slovic, Paul et al.
I' 
The Psychometric Study of Risk Perception 
Paul Slavic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein 
Decision Research 
A Branch of Perceptronics 
1201 Oak Street 
Eugene, Oregon 97401 
Slavic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtentstein, S. The Psychometric 
study of risk perception. In J. Menkes, V. Covello, & J. Mumpower 
(Eds.), Contemporary issues in risk analysis: The behavioral and 
social sciences. New York: Plenum, in press. 
~-~---,.~-------~----··,.-~-~r-------·-------.,......-..-·---~--------------.p) 
Acknowledgement 
The writ~ng of this paper was supported by the National Science 
Foundation under Grant PRA-8116925 to Perceptronics, Inc. Any 
opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed here 
.. . 
are those of the authors · and do not necessarily reflect the views .of 
the National Science Foundation. 
I> 
page 1 
The Psychometric Study of Risk Perception 
Introduction 
In industrialized societies, the question "How safe is safe 
enough?" has emerged as. a major policy issue of the 1980s. The 
frequ~nt discovery. of new hazards and the widespread publicity they 
receive is causing mor~ and more individuals to see themselves as 
the victim·s, rather than as the beneficiaries, of technology. These 
fears and the oppos~tion to· technology that they produce have 
perplexed industrialists and regulators and led many observers to 
argue that the public's apparent pursuit of a "zero-risk society" 
threatens the nation's political and economic stability (Harris, 
1980; Wildavsky,· 1979). 
In order to understand this problem, a number of researchers· 
have begun to. examine the opinions that people express when .. they are 
asked, .in a variety of ways, to evaluate hazardous activities and 
technologies. This research has attempted to develop techniques for 
assessing the complex and subtle opinions that people have about 
risk. With these ,techniques, researchers have sought to discover 
what people mean.when they say that something is (or is not) 
"risky," and to determine what factors underlie. those perceptions. 
If succes·sful, this research should aid policy makers by improving 
communication between them and the lay pubiic, by directing 
educational efforts, and by predicting public responses to new 
hazards, event~ (e.g., a good safety record, an accident), and 
management strategies (e.g., warning labels, regulations, substitute 
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products)~ A broad agenda for this research includes the following 
questions: 
(1) What are the determinants of "perceived risk?" What are the 
concepts by which people characterize risks? How are those concepts 
related to their attitudes and behavior towards different 
technologies? To what extent are risk perceptions affected by 
emotional factors? For example, are they really sensitive, as is 
often claimed, to perceived controllability of risks a:nd the dread 
they evoke? How adequate are the methods used to study perceptions 
of risk? 
(2) How ~ccurate are public perc·eptions? When laypeople err, is 
it because they are .poorly informed or because they were unable to 
do better? Are people so poorly informed (and uneducable) that they 
require paternalistic institutions to protect them? Would they be 
better off letting technical experts make most of the important 
decisions? Or do they know enough to be able to make their own 
decisions in the marketplace? When experts and laypeople disagree 
about risk, is it always the latter who are in error? 
(3) What steps are needed to foster enlightened behavior with 
regard to risk? What information do policy makers and the public 
need? How ~hould such information be presented? What indices or 
criteria are useful for ,putting diverse risks in peq;pective? How 
can the news media and the schools help to e_ducate people about risk 
and its management? 
(4) What is the role of judgment in technical assessments of 
risk? When ~~perts are forced to go beyond hard evidence and rely 
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on educated intuitio·n, do they encounter judgmental difficulties 
similar to those experienced by laypeople? How well do experts 
assess the limits of their own knowledge? How can technical 
judgments be improved? 
(5) How do people perceive the benefits of risky technologies? 
Almost all questions asked about risk perceptions have analogs with 
benefit perceptions. 
( 6) What determines the relativ·e acceptability of. hazardous 
technologies? How are assessments of their various' risks and 
benefits combined subjectively? What role do considerations such as 
voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and equity play? What risk-
benefit considerations motivate people to political action? Are 
some kinds of risks unacceptable, no matter what benefits they are 
expected to bring? 
(7) What makes a risk analysis "acceptable?" Some analyses are 
able to guide society's re·sponses, whereas others only ·fuel debate. 
Are these differences due to the specific hazards involved, the 
political philosophy underlying:the analytical methods, the way that 
the public is in_volved in' the decision-making process, the results 
of the analysis, or the manner in which the results are 
communicated? Can policy makers responsibly incorporate social 
values into risk analysis? 
' . ~ (8) How can polarized social conflict involving risk be reduced? 
Can an atmosphere of trust and mutµal. respect be created among 
opposing par.ties? Ho\J can we design an environment_ in which 
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eff~ctive, multi-way communication, constructive debate, and 
compromise can·take place? 
The Psychometric Paradigm 
One broad strategy for studying perceived risk is to develop a 
taxonomy' for.hazards that can be. used to understand and predict 
responses to their risks. A taxonomic scheme might explain, for 
example, people's extreme aversion to some hazards, their 
indifference to others, and the discrepancies between these 
reactions and experts~ opinions. The most common approach to this 
goal has employed the psychometric paradigm (Fischhoff~ Slavic, 
' 
Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 197/8; Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 
1982), which uses psychophysical scaling and multivariate analysis 
techniques to pro~uce ~uantitative representations or "cognitive 
maps" of risk attitudes and perceptions. Within the psychometric 
paradigm, people make quantitative judgments about the current and 
desired riskiness of diverse hazards and the desired level of 
regulation of each. These judgments are then related to judgments 
about other properties, such as: (i) the"hazard's status on 
characteristics that have been hypothesized to account for risk 
perceptions and attitudes (e.g., voluntariness, dread, knowledge, 
controllability); (ii) the benefits that each hazard proviaes to 
society; (iii). the number of deaths caused by the hazard in an 
average year; (iv) the number of deaths caused by the hazard in a 
disastrous year; and (v) the seriousnes~ of each death from a 
particular hazard relative to a death due. to other causes. 
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The remainder of this paper briefly reviews some of the results 
obt.ained from psychometric studies of risk perception, including 
some previously unreported results. In doing so, it examines a few 
of the methodological and substantive issues surrounding the basic 
approach and outlines some potentially fruitful directions for 
future research. 
-· 
Previous Work 
Revealed and Expressed Preferences 
The original impetus for the psychometric paradigm came from the 
. . 
pioneering effort of Starr (1969) to develop a method for weighing 
technological risks against henefits in order to answer the 
fundamental question. "How safe is safe· enough?" His revealed 
preference approach assumed that, by trial and error, society has 
arrived at an "essentially optimum" balance between the risks and 
benefits associated with any activity. One may therefore use 
historical or current risk and benefit data to reveal patt~rns of 
"acceptable" risk-benefit tradeoffs. Examining such data for 
several common industries and activities, Starr concluded that (a) 
acceptability of risk from an activity is roughly proportional to 
the third power (cube) of the benefits for that activity and (b) the 
public will accept risks from voluntary activities (e.g.,- skiing) 
that are roughly 1,000 .times greater than it would tolerate from 
involuntary hazards (e.g., food preservatives) that provide the same 
level of benefit. 
The merits· and deficien'cies of Starr Is approach have been 
debated at length (see, e.g., Ffschhoff~ Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby 
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& Keeney,, 1981). We shall not go into them here, except to note 
that concern about the validity of the many assumptions inherent in 
the revealed pre~erences approach stimulated Fischhoff et al. (1978) 
to conduct an analogous psychometric analysis of questionnaire data, 
. . . ~ . 
resu~ting in expressed preferences. In recent years, numerous other 
studies of expressed preferences have been carried out withi~ the 
psychometric paradigm (see, for example, Brown & Green, 1980; 
Gardner, Tiemann, Gould, DeLuca, Doob & Stolwijk, 1982; Green, 1980; 
Green & Brown, 1980; Johnson & TverskY, in press; Lindell & Earle, 
1982; MacGill, 1982; Renn, 1981; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 
1980a, in press-b; Tiemann & Tiemann, 1983; Vlek & Stallen, 1981; 
von Winterfeldt, John & Borcherding, l 98tL). 
. \_,r 
Although the results of these studies differ somewhat, they have 
shown that perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. 
Psychometric techniques seem well suited for identifying 
similarities and differences among groups with regard to risk 
perceptions and attitudes (see Table 1). They have also shown that 
the concept "risk" means different things to different people. When 
experts judge risk, their responses correlate highly with technical 
estimates of annual fatalities •. Laypeople can assess 'annual 
fatalities if they are.asked to (and produce estimates somewhat like 
the technical estimates). However, their judgments of "risk" are 
sensitive to other ,.factors as well (e.g., catastrophic potential, 
threat to future generations) and, as a result, tend to differ from 
their own (and experts') estimates of annual fatalities. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
Another consistent result from psychometric studies of expressed 
preferences is that peop'le tend to view current r'isk levels as 
unacceptably. high for most activities. The gap between perceived 
and desired risk levels suggest that people are not satisfied,''with 
the way that market and other regulatory mechanisms have balanced 
risks and benefits. Across the domain of hazards, there seems to be 
little systematic !elationship between perceived existing risks and 
benefits. However, studies of expressed preferences do seem to 
support Starr's claim that people are willing to tolerate higher 
risks from activities seen as highly beneficial. But whereas Starr 
concluded that volun.tariness of exposure was the key mediator of 
risk acceptance, expresse~ preference studies have shown that other 
characteristics such as familiarity, cont'rol, catastrophic 
potential,' equity, and level of knowledge also seem to influence the 
relationship between perceived risk, perceived benefit, and risk 
acceptance (see, e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic et al., 
1980a). 
Various models have been advanced to represen·t the relationships 
between percep.tions, behavior, and these qualitative characteristics 
of hazards. As we shall see, the picture that emerges from this 
work is both orderly and complex. 
Factor Analytic Representations 
Many of ·the qualitative risk characteristics are highly 
correlated with each other, across a wide range of hazards. For 
I' 
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example,· hazards rated as "voluntary" tend also to be rated as 
"controllable" and "well known;" hazards th~t appear to·threaten 
future generations tend also to be seen as having catastrophic 
potential, and so. on. Investigation of these interrelationships by 
means of factor analysis has shown that the broader domain of 
characteristics can be condensed to a small set of higher-.order 
'' 
characteristics or factors. 
The factor spaces presented in Figures 1 and 2 have been 
replicated across groups of laypersons and experts judging large and 
diverse sets of hazards. The factors in this space reflect the 
degree to which a r.isk is understood and the degree to which it 
evokes a feeling of dread. A third factor, reflecting the number of 
people exposed' to the risk, has been obtained in several studies. 
Making the set of hazards more specific (e.g., partitioning nuclear 
power into radioactive waste transport, uranium mining, nuclear 
reactor accidents, etc.) has had little effect on the factor 
structure or its relationship to risk perceptions (Slovic, Fischhoff 
& Lichtenstein, in press-b). 
-----------------.------·--------
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
The story that has emerged from factor-analytic studies of 
. ' perceived risk has been so consistent that one is tempted to believe 
. 
· iri its unive'rsality •. However, there are additional facets to the 
stqry, as indicated by other recent studies. For example, Tiemann 
and Tiemann (1983) used a factor-analytic technique that allowed 
them to study individual differences in risk ·and benefit 
.. 
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orientations toward a set of hazards. Four major themes (or 
cognitive maps) emerged from these analyses, allowing subjects to be 
categorized as (1) benefU oriented, (2) risk oriented, (3) 
trade-off oriented, or ( 4) polarized. The trade-off respond.en ts 
perceived some activities as both risky and highly beneficial and 
. 
other activities as both low in risk and low in benefits. The 
polarized individuals saw activities having high be~efit as having 
low risk and vice versa. 
Similarity-based representations 
Whereas factor-analytic studies provide respondents with a 
predetermined set of risk characteristics to rate, an alternative 
appro~ch asks for ratings of the overall si~ilarity between pairs of 
hazards. Multidimensional scaling techniques are then used to 
' derive a dimensional representation of the similarity space. 
Multidimensional scaling of similarity judgments for small sets of 
r-·. 
hazards by Vlek and Stallen , ( l 9[?J) and Green and Brown ( 1980) has 
produced two-dimensional representations similar to those obtained 
in our factor-analytic studies. However, Vlek and Stallen found 
substantial individual differences in the weighting of the· 
dimensions. 
Johnson and Tversky (in press) have compared factor analytic and 
similarity representations derived from the same set of 18 hazards. 
The hazards differed from those in F.igures 1 and 2 in that they 
included natural hazards and diseases as well as activities and 
technolog~es. ~hey fou~d that the factor space derived from this 
set of hazards resembled the· space derived from earlier studies. 
' 
., 
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However, they found that the space,obtained from the 
multidimensionai sc~ling of similarity judgments differed from the 
factor analytic space. Further analysis showed that judgments of 
similarity based on direct comparisons of hazards were, in most 
cases, quite different from similarity inc;lices obtained by comparing 
the hazards across the set of characteristics supplied by the 
experimenter. For example, homicide was judged to be similar to 
other acts of violence (war, terrorism) despite having a very 
.different profil~ on the various risk characteristics. Although 
similarity judgments are not constrained by characteristics selected 
by the researcher, they may be susceptible to influence from 
considerations that are not relev.ant to risk. Thus Hutchinson 
(1980) found that nuclear power.and non-nuclear electric power were 
. ' . 
judged quite similar, perhaps because of their common element of 
power production. 
In addition to proqucirig a multidimensional representation of 
the similarity data, Johnson and Tversky constructed·a tree 
representation (Figure 3). The risks are the terminal nodes of the 
tree and the'distance between ariy pair of iisks .is given by.the 
length of the horizontal parts of the shortest path that joins them; 
the vert.ical part is included only for graphical convenience. 
Figure 3.exhibits a distinc~·hierarchy of clusters which Johnson and 
Tversky called: hazards, accidents, violent acts, technological 
disasters and diseases. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
'. 
--------------------------
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Implications of Psychometric Research 
The social and policy implications of this research have been a 
matter of lively debate, taking up most of the June, 1982 issue of 
the journal, Risk Analysis. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), argue'd 
that psychometric studies, with their cognitive emphasis, ignore the 
social processes that play a major role in determining which risks 
society fears and which it ignores. Otway and Thomas (1982) have 
taken a particularly cynical view, arguing that this research is 
being used as a tool in a discourse which i~ not concerned with 
risks per se, nor with perceptual an4 cognitive processes. Rather, 
the hidden agenda is the legitimacy of decision-making institutions 
and the equitable distribution of hazards and benefits. 
Our view (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1982) is that an 
understanding·of how people.think about risk has an important role 
in informing policy, even if it cannot resolve all questions. 
Moreover, risk perception research can be. u·sed · to challenge 
social-political assumptions as well as to reinfo:i;ce them (e.g., 
Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983). The psychometric studies 
described above provide the beginnings of a psychological 
classification system for hazards that may help explain and forecast 
reactions to ~pecific technologies, such as nuclear power or genetic 
engineering (e.g., Slovic, Licht~nstein & Fischhoff, in press) or 
provide guidelines for managing the social conflicts surrounding 
hazardous technologies (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1983). For 
example, even the present rudimentary state of .knowledge about 
mental representations of hazards has proven relevant for evaluating 
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proposed safety goals for nuclear power (Fischhoff, 1983; Slovic, 
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, in press-a). 
As for the different representations that have been derived from 
different methods ·of analysis, it now seems apparent that there is 
no one way to model risk perception, no universal cognitive map. 
People maintain multiple perspectives on the world of hazards. What 
remains to be determined is how these diverse perspectives influence 
their attitudes and behaviors. For example, we have found that, for 
laypeople, both the level of perceived risk associated with a 
p'articular hazard and attitudes towards regulating these risks can 
be predicted quite well from knowledge of where that hazard falls 
within the space deriv~d from factor analysis (see Figure 4). Most 
important is the factor "Dread Risk." The higher a ha.zard 's score 
on this factor, the higher its perceived risk, the more people want 
to see its current. risks reduced, and the more they want to see 
strict regula~ion employed io achieve the desired reduction in risk. 
Expert's perceptions of risk, however, seem much less closely 
related to the factor space. Instead, experts appear to focus on 
expected annual mortality when judging riskiness and, presumably, 
when considering the need to regulate (Hohenemser, Kates & Slavic, 
1983; Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979). As a re,sult, some 
conflicts over "risk''. may result from experts and laypeople having 
different definitions of the concept. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
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Johnson and Tversky (in press) hypothesize that similarity-based 
representations may play an important role in predicting people's 
responses· to new risks or to new evidence about risk. For example, 
the Tylenol poisoning appeared to provoke fears concerning over the 
counte.r drugs but not other products ( such as foods) that could 
easily be subject to tampering. They also speculated that the 
similarity between nuclear power and nuclear warfare might fuel much 
of the publi'c debate about the acceptability of nuclear power 
reactors. 
Current Research 
Our most recent work has used psychometric techniques to 
investigate three distinct topics. The first study considers how 
the social consequences of an accident are affected by the number of 
deaths it causes. The second study exariiines the concept of risk and 
the possibility of constr\,lcting a .comprehensive measure of risk. 
The third ·study adcires�es an important methodological question, 
regarding the degree to which cognitive representations derived from 
analyses of group mean data across diverse hazards can be 
generalized to individuals' perceptions of particular hazards. 
Modeling the Socie.tal Impact of Fatai Accidents 
A frequently asked question in the application of formal 
analysis to safety decisio.ns is: "How should a single accident that 
fakes N. lives be weighted r.elative to N accidents, each of which 
. ' "  
takes a single life?" Because safety respurces are limitecl, 
assigning disproportionate weight to multiple-fatality accidents 
would emphasize prevention of such accidents at the cost of 
increasing the risk.from smaller accidents. 
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In our approach to this P.roblem (Slovic, Lichtenstein' & 
Fischhoff, in press), we followed Keeney's (1980) distinction 
between the personal impacts of a fatal accident and the societal 
impacts. The former include the pain, suffering, and economic 
hardship of the. victims and their friends and relatives, whereas the 
latter, include the public distress and .the political, social, and 
economic turmoil that may result from an accident. Our focus was on 
the societal impacts. 
A number of proposal.s have been put forth regarding the proper 
way to model the societal impact of fatal accidents. Most of these 
describe the social cost of losin� N lives in a single accident as a 
function of N
a
. A common view is that a· single large accident is 
more serious than many small accidents producing the same number of 
fatalitf�s; henc� q)l. 
The·complex nature.of risk perception revealed in the 
psychometric studies made us doubt that any simple function of N 
c9uld adequately capture the societal importance of a fatal 
accident. Perhaps the .most dr.amatic anecdotal evidence in support 
of these .doubts comes from the societal response to the accident at 
' . 
the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclel'lr.:.reactor in 1979. Although it 
caused no immediate deaths and is· expected t.o produce few if any 
latent cancer fatalities, this accident hgs greatly affected the 
structure and the vtability of the entire n.uclea.r power industry 
(Evans and Hope, 1982). Its enormous societal impact would never 
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have been predicted by the·N~model or any other model based solely 
on the number of fatalities. 
Reflection on the factor-analytic model in Figure 1 and 2 
. .a 
suggests that, although the N model may capture some aspect of 
Factor 1, the dread evoked by an event, it does not consider Factor 
2, the degree to which t,he risks are thought to be known or 
understood. As a result, we hypothesized that one ingredient 
missing in the Na models is recognition of the role that accidents 
play in providing information about possible future trouble. Thus, 
the social impact of an accident.may be large, regardless of its 
death toll, if the accident shows the hazard to· be poorly understood 
and, hence, 1~l_rii_i'~}a large increase in its risk. In this view, the 
accident at TMI was seen as an informative and ominous signal, 
raising fears that this technology was not understood well enough to· 
be adequately under control. As a result, the accident led to a 
strong sociopolitical reaction whose consequences (stricter 
regulation of the nuclear industry, reduced operation of reactors 
worldwide, increased costs of reactor construction and operati:on) 
dwarfed the more direct costs (possible latent cancers, property 
damage, repairs, cleanup), significant as these were. 
The potential importance of viewing accidents as signals goes 
beyond the domain of nuclear powe.r. The generality of this concept 
is demonstrated by a study ( reported ~by Slavic, Fischhot f & 
c ,t 
Lichtenstein, 1980a) in which we asked 21· women (median age= 37) to 
rate the seriousness of 10 hypothetical accidents. Several,aspects 
of seriousness were rated, including: 
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(a) The total amount of suffering and grief caused by the loss 
of life in each mishap; 
(b) The number of people who need to be made aware of the mishap 
via the media; 
(c) The amount of effort (and money) that should be put into 
investigating the cause of the mishap and preventing its recurrence; 
'and 
(d) The degree to which hearing about the mishap would cause on~ 
to be worried and upset during the next few days. 
Respondents also !ated the informativeness of these incidents, 
defined as the degree to which the mishap told them (and society) 
~omething that may not have been kn9wn about the hazardousness of 
the specific activity. 
The accidents were co,nstructed so as to vary with respect to 
total fatalities and informativeness ~_see Table 2). The five. less-
informative accidents represented incidents that were generated by 
reasonably familiar and understood processes. The more informative 
mishaps_were designed to signal a change in riskiness (perhaps 
caused by a breakdown in the system controlling the hazard). and some 
potentia_l for the proliferation of similar mishaps: For example, a 
. bus skidding on ice represented a low-information mishap because its 
occurrence did not signal a change in motor-vehicle risks (except 
for a limited ·time at_ that site), whereas an accident caused by a 
poorly designed steering system in a new model aut9mobile would be 
informative about all such.vehicles. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
In general, the personal impacts of an accident, as measured by 
the amount of suffering_ and grief attributed to it, was found to be 
closely related to the number of people killed. All other 
(societal) aspects of perceived seriousness were, however, more 
. . . 
closely related to the accident's information content. Accidents 
signaling a possible breakdown in safety control systems and the 
possibility of proliferation were judged more worrisome and in need 
of both greater awareness and greater public effort to prevent 
reoccurrence. The number of people killed was not related to these 
aspects of seriousness. 
To test our speculition about the relationship between accident 
impact and the risk factors, we conducted a second study comparing 
ratings of informativeness and seriousness with the location of the 
hazard within the factor structure shown in Figure 2. Our stimuli 
were 30 haza_rds, distributed across the four quadrants of the factor 
space. From the high dread, high unknown quadrant, we selected 
hazards such as DNA technology, nuclear reactors, orbiting .space 
satellites, and radioactive waste. Highly unknown but not dread 
hazards included microwave ovens, contraceptives, water 
chlorination, and antibiotics. Known and dread hazards included 
coal mining,.nerve gas, dams, and commercial aviation. Known but 
not dread hazards included p~wer mowers, bicycles, automobiles, and 
ricreational boating. 
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The participants in this study we.re 78 university students who 
.rated each hazard according to the degree to which an accident 
taking 1 or 2 .lives . "serves as a; warning signal for society, 
providing new information about the probability that similar or even 
more destructive mishaps may 9ccur within this type of activity." 
The participants also rated the overall "seriousness" of an accident 
involving each.of those hazards (holding fatalities and other 
damages constant). 
Each hazard is represented, in Figure 5, by a point whose size 
reflects its mean rating of signal potential. It is apparent that 
the judged signal ·potential of a hazard is closely related ~o 
location within the space. Signal potential correlated with the 
"dread" factor (r=.58), the "unknown" factor (r=.71), and their 
linear combination (r=.92). It also correlated .94 with mean 
ratings of the overall seriousness of an accident. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
This analysis has led us to a number of specific conclusions. 
First, the societal impact of fat.al accidents cannot be modeled 
solely by a,function of N. As a result, models based on such 
functions should not be used to guide policy decisions. 
Second, accident impact models need to consider signal 
potential. Unlike Na models, which reflect attitudes regarding how 
deaths are clustered, signal potential involves an informational 
variable that should be central to any reasonable planning analysis • 
. . 
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Third, the concept of accidents as. signals helps explain 
society's strong response to some nuclear power mishaps. Because 
reactor risks tend to be perceived as poorly understood and 
catastrophic, accidents with. few direct casualties may be seen as 
omens of disaster, thus producing indirect or "ripple" effects 
resulting in immense costs to the industry and to society. One 
implication of signal value is that great effort and expense might 
be warranted to minimize the possibility of small but frightening 
reactor accidents. 
Finally, when attempting to model the societal impacts of high 
signal-value accidents, we see no alternative but to elaborate the 
various events and consequences that may result from such accidents, 
the consequences of those consequences, the probabilities of all 
these d_irect and higher-order effects' and ··some measures of their 
costs. Although such detailed modeling may appear unmanageably 
complex, even a rough attempt to anticipate possible higher-order 
consequences of an accident is preferable to the use of simpler 
models with known inadequacies. Psychometric studies may ena?le 
analysts.to forecast which classes -of accidents will be the most 
potent signals, hence most in need of complex modeling. 
Defining Risk 
Technical experts tend to view risk as synonymous with mortality 
and morbidity. This is evident not only in their responses to 
psychometric surveys (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979), but 
in the ways that they conduct risk analyses (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission,, 1975) and in the presentations they create to "put risks 
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in perspective." These presentations typically involve elaborate 
tables and even "catalogs of risk" in which some unidimensional 
index of death or disability is displayed for a broad spectrum.of 
iife's hazards. These indices include risks per hour of exposure 
. (S~wby, 1965), annual probabilities of death (Wilson, 1979) and 
reductions.in life expectancy (Cohen & Lee, 1979; Reissland & 
Harries, 1979) .• Those presenting these data typically assume that 
such information will aid decision makers, even though such 
comparisons have no logically necessary implications for the 
acceptability of risks (Fischhoff et al., 1981). 
Psychometric.studies of perceived risk imply that mortality and 
morbidity statistics will not, by themselves, be satisfactory 
indices of risk.: People's perceptions and attitudes are determined 
by a variety of quantitative and qualitative characteristics such as 
those underlying Figure 2. Attempts to characterize, compare, and 
regulate risks must be sensitive to the broader conception of risk 
that underlies people's concerns. 
We shall describe next a recent attempt by Fischhoff, Watson, 
and Hope (in press) to demonstrate a general approach for 
constructing a more adequate definition of risk. Such an index 
cannot dictate decisions but can provide necessary input to them, 
'. 
along with measu.res of non-risk costs and benefits.. Other uses for 
an index of.risk would be to educate one's intuition, set standards, 
help agencies allocate resources for risk management and help 
institutions evaluate and defend their actions (Fischhoff, in press; 
Watson, 1983). 
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Fischhoff et'al. emphasized that the definition and measurement 
of risk is inherently· controversial, because of the value issues 
raised in ~pecifying the concept and ·.En'e~po·werr-cie'tlfosespecif:fcations 
"~----- -- •• ., ... - • .J .._,_.,.-"-· '~-- ~~./ ..--...... -.-.,-··-···v,.._..,.. 
I,;) 
to influence important decisions. :Furthermore, no one definition is 
correct, or suitable, for all problems. Choice of a definition is a 
political act, reflecting the perceived importance of different 
adverse ef_fects in a particular situation~ As a result, choosing a 
- • I 
: 
measure for risk should not be the exclusive· province of scientists, 
who have no special insight into wqat society should value. The 
I 
approach' suggested by Fischhoff et_ :al. is, therefore, general enough 
I 
to be adjusted to.diverse problems ;and value systems. 
The approach was demonstrated within the context of evaluating 
energy technologies. Its first st~p is determining what 
' ! ' 
consequences should be included in ;the measure. The illustrative 
I 
index included mortality, concern~ and morbidity. Mortality risks 
twere subdivided into risks to the general public and risks to 
- ,.. __ : . 
workers. Concern was similarly partitioned into two dimensions 
based upon psychometric studies: unknown risk and' dread risk. The 
former expresses aversion to uncertainty. The latter captures a 
risk's ability to ~voke a Visceral response •. 
The next step is to aggregate these components into an overall 
measure of risk. Here Fischhoff et al. relied on multiattribute 
utility theory '(Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), which provides a framework 
for determining the relative weights (tradeoffs) among the various 
components and integrating them into a single numerical index. 
Given the validity of certain assumptions, it becomes possible to 
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express the risk index R in terms of the equation 
wher.e xi is the measure on compon~nt i and wi is the weight for that · 
component. 
Fischhoff e~ al. prese~ted a detailed application of this 
technique in the context of evaluating energy technologies. The 
application demonstrated how sensitive the overall index of risk is 
I 
to the component attributes included in the definition of risk and 
to the weights as.signed judgmentally to these attributes·. · As a 
result, the relative riskiness of these technologies depends upon 
what is meant by "risk." The analysis was not intended to produce a 
"correct" definition--which is a practical and political matter. 
Rather, it pointed to the issues that must be addressed if a 
politically acceptable and logically sound measure is to be created. 
In addition, it offered a highly flexible methodology with which to 
address these issues. Because the process of defini_ng and measuring 
risks requires a variety of explicit value judgments, the present 
analysis highlights the need for effective public debate about what 
sorts of consequences are legitimate components o.f "risk." 
Modeling the Perception of Individuals 
Psychometric studies grew out of an interest in understanding 
. ' . 
why the risks from some hazardous activities appeared to be treated 
differently from the risks of other activities •. In most of these 
studies, after many subjects _have evaluated many technologies, the 
' mean rating for each technology and each risk aspect, calculated 
---- -·-- .. 
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across subjects, becomes the unit of analysis. Thus information 
about how _individuals differ is lost, in return for a more stable 
look at differe.nces between ·technologies. 
!, ' 
From these studies a theory of risk perception· has emerged: lay 
people's risk judgments are based not just on their·beliefs about 
fatalit';i:es, but also on their beliefs about several risk 
characteristics such as the technologies' catastrophic potential, 
dreadedness, ~nd severity ~f consequences should an accident occur. 
Further, people's desire for reduction of'.risk seems closely related 
to their perception of how much risk now exists. 
If this theory is valid for a group, it should also be valid for 
many of the individuals in the group. Further, it may be that a 
,·. 
number of people all share the same theory,yet differ in their 
jud~ments of the risk characteristics of a particular hazard. For 
example, some people may not consider pesticides risky because they 
believe that pesticides do not present any catastrophic potential, 
whereas others who perceive such potential in pesticides will judge 
them as highly risky. 
This possibility suggests that the unit of analysis be single 
indjviduals' ratings of risk aspects. As Gardner et al. (1982) have 
pointed out, there is na logical necessity that the relationships 
found across hazards will also be found within a single hazard 
across individuals. However, if such similarities were to be found, 
the theory would be strengthened and expanded. Additionally, we 
would have a better understanding of the so-frequently observed 
disagreements among members of our society about the risk of hazards 
.·""\' 
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such as nuclear power. Finally, adopting the individual as the·unit 
of analysis would enable researchers to study the effect of 
individual differences such as level of education or attitudes about 
the effectiveness of governmental intervention on risk perception. 
·' 
Countering these advantages are difficulties encountered in 
using the individual-differences approach.- First, occasional 
mistakes or carelessness in ratings can produce an error component 
large en9ugh to obscure genuine relationships among the ratings. 
This source of error is lessened when the ratings·are averaged 
across individuals. A second source of error comes from individual 
differences in the way people use response scales. For exampie, one 
person may feel very strongly about some things yet is reluctant to 
use extreme numbers, while another person whose beliefs are more 
neutral may make finer discriminations and thus tend to use extreme 
responses. Finally, variation .in beliefs across individuals is a 
necessary (although not sufffcient) condition for detecting 
correlations. If all respondents, .for example, believe that nuclear 
power is a dreaded technology and thus give it a high rating on the• 
scale of dreadedness, this,scale cannot show a correlation with 
perceived risk when the correlation is.computed across individuals. 
If the tested group is homogeneous, individual analysis will fail 
even if the theory is true. 
In designing a study to explore individual differences in 
perceptions ot: the risk of nuclear power, Gardner et al. (1982) 
recognized the need for a maximal variation in opinions. Their 
subjectsincluded Sierra Club members, students, carwash attendants, 
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Rotary Club mem~ers, .and nuclear power engineers. : Using many of the 
same scales as had been used in cross-hazard research, they found, 
in correlations across 367 respondents, many of the 
same relationships between perceived risk, desired risk, and risk 
characteristics as were found in the cross-hazard studies ·by 
Fischhoff et al. (1978) and Slavic et al. (1979; 1980a). Gardner et 
al. concluded that the similarity of results was. noteworthy, given 
the .differences in the procedures that produced them. 
:Pursuing this question, we have reexamined some of our original 
data, looking at correlations between perceived risk, .desired risk 
reduction, and risk ch~racteristics across individuals within 
. ' 
hazards. The subjects were the 95 laypeople whose responses were 
previously used in grouped, cross-hazard analyses reported by Slavic 
et al. (in press-b). The subjects came from three groups: members 
of the League of Wo~en Voters and their spouses, members of the 
Active Club (a business and professional group), and college 
students. For the present analyses ,the three subgroups were 
combine~. 
For each of the 30 hazards listed in Table 1, individual 
judgments of the riskiness of the hazard were correlated, acro~s the 
subjects, with ratings, for that hazard, of nine risk character-
istics (e.g., voluntariness, immediacy of effects) and with a 
measure of desire fdr reduction in the risk of that hazard. Thus 
for each hazard the individual risk ratings were correlated with 10 
other variables, as listed in Tabie 3. 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
In order to reduce the possible effects of response bias, all )1 
variables were standardized before the correlations were computed. 
The original risk measure was a ratio-scale judgment in which the 
subjects assigned a score of 10 to whichever hazard the subject 
believed was least risky;. other hazard's were judged relative to that 
least-risky hazard. For the present analysis, the risk judgments 
were ranked, within each individual acr·oss the 30 hazards, and these 
rank scores were used in the correlations. The original risk 
characteristic measures were seven-point rating scales. For each of 
these 9 scales, each individual's ratings were 'transformed by a 
linear function that produced a new scale with mean of O and 
standard dev.iation of 1 across the 30 hazards. These standard 
scores were used for the correlations. The original measure of 
desire for risk reduction was a ratio judgment. A judgment-greater 
than 1.0 indicated that "serious action, such as legislation to 
restrict its practise, ~hould be taken [td reduce the risk)"; a 
' judgf!lent less than 1.0 meant 'that "the risk of death could be higher 
than it is now before society would have to take serious action" 
(Fischhoff et al., 1978, P• 132). These adjustment factors were 
ranked across hazards for each.individual for the present analysis. 
Results of the within-hazard analyses are shown in Table 3. For 
comparison, the first column presents the cross-hazard correlations 
based on the same data. For these cross-hazard correlations, the 
variables were not standardized. For perceived rii;k and desire for 
-- .,....-- ..... ,.._.,_ ........ 
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risk reduction, geometric means were taken across the 95 subjects; 
for the 9 ri~k characteristics, mean ratings were used. 
In the cross-hazard analyses, perceived risk correlated most, 
. ' 
highly with dread and severity of consequences and secondarily with 
catastrophic potential; all key components of the dread factor that 
emerged from the factor analyses ~f these data. Also, perceived 
risk correlated highly (.81) with desired risk reduction. 
The second column of Table 3 presents a summary of the 
individual-difference analyses: The mean of the 30 correlations for 
. each variable. For the first 6 variables,, these means accurately 
summarize the.lack of correlation found across all 30 hazards. Only 
one of these correlations exceeded .30: for Pesticides, perc~ived 
risk correlated -.32 with voluntariness, indicating that, to a 
' 
slight degree~ those who viewed exposure to pesticides as more 
involuntary also viewed them as more risky. 
The mean correlation of .11 for catastrophic potential reflects, 
in part, the many hazards with little possibility of catastrophe; 
. I',..., . 
individual differences thus did- not appear in the catastrop~_ '.; 
ratings of these hazards. Four hazards showed correlations in the 
.30's: Nuclear Power, Non-nuclear Electric Power, Antibiotics, and 
Spray Cans. 
The dread variable was correl~ted .20 or greatei with perceived 
risk for 13 of the 30 hazards; the severity of consequences variable 
showed such.correlations for 22 hazards. As suggested by the mean 
of .43, the measure of desi~e for risk reduction was consistently 
related to perceived risk; for only two hazards was the correlation 
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less than .20. Thus for most hazards, those people who believed a 
hazard was more risky also believed that there was a greater need 
for risk reduction. 
The last two columns show the individual-difference correlations 
' 
for Nuclear Power and Bicycles. The former is typical of the 
hazards for which individual differences were found. The latter 
illustrates the lack of correlation in hazardi having only small 
individual differences. 
In sum~ the present analysis provides modest support for the· 
application of risk perception theory to individual differences. As 
expected,' the correlations were low. Because of the problems 
associ~ted with within-hazard correlational studies, it might be 
more fruitful to use a quite different d~sign to study the 
attributes of risk perception in individuals. This possibility is 
explored in the next section. 
Issues for Future Research 
' 
Althougti much progress has been made toward understanding the 
nature and implications of risk perception, we still lack definitive 
answers t·o the lengthy list of que.stions presented in the 
introduction to this paper. One obvious need is to conduct 
psychometric surveys of the general popul~tion and special 
populations of interest (such as hazard victims, technical experts, 
neighbors of hazardous facilities, legislators, journalists, and 
activist~. Cross-national surveys would also be of interest. Some 
of this broader sampling is currently underway, as indicated by the 
accompanying "chapters in .this section. Among the many research 
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directions.worth pursuing, we shall concentrate here on three: 
designing new approaches to modeling cognitive representations of 
risk, extending the factor-analytic approach, and moving toward 
educating people, rather than just studying them. 
New Methods for Modeling Risk Perceptions 
The previous section discussed the possibilities and limitations 
of modeling the perceptions of individuals with correlational 
methods. Other techniques may be applied to this problem. One that 
has proven useful elsewhere is the analysis~of-variance approach to 
capturing judgmental policies (Anderson, 1981; Slovic & 
,Lichtenstein, 1971). This approach starts by identifying a set of 
critical characteristics or dimensions. Next, a set of stimulus 
item~ (h~zards in this case) are-~onstructed in term; of their 
status on these various dimensions or characteristics. Thus item 
(haz~rd) x1 might be defined in terms of its catastrophic potential 
(y 1), the level of scientific uncertainty regarding its risks(y 2 ), 
the dread ·fr evokes (y3 ), some aspects of its benefits (y4 , y5 , 
• • • , Yi). and other dimensions ,selected by the researcher 
(yi+l•••Y
0
). The items are constructed so that acro~s the set, any 
pair of dimensions (y.,yk) are'uncorrelated. Factorial combinations J . 
of the stimult,1s dimensions are used to accomplish this. Each 
individual judges every hazard in the set on some criterion variable 
such as~k~otacceptability of risk, after whi,ch analysis of 
variance methods are used to model the relative importance of each 
stimulus dimension in producing the overall judgments. 
,· 
I 
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This general! approach has be'en used to model a wide variety of 
judgments (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer & 
Steinmann,, 1975; Anderson, 1981). The advantage here is that the 
same basic design can be used to modei'the importance of hazard 
characteristics in determining judgments both. ,across hazards an:d 
within hazards. In
1 
fact, the identical set of stimuli (hazard 
profiles) could be used in both- studies. For example, to study 
individual perceptions of a single hazard, the various profiles 
could be said to represent the assessments of different individuals 
each viewing the same hazard. The subject would be asked to predict 
how each of these individuals would judge the criterion (say risk) 
from knowledge of the way that individual perceived the hazard 
profile. Iri · the cro_ss-hazard design, these same stimuli would be 
said to represent different hazards. The subject would be asked to 
judge their riskin_ess (or rate how others would judge their 
riskiness). Thus models describing the importance of various hazard 
characteristics could be derived on the basis of judgments about th~ 
same stimuli under two different cover stories. Comparison of the 
resulting models would indicate whether'or not the cross-hazard 
judgments and, the within-hazard judgments appeared to· be generated 
in the same way. Of course, there are many variations possible with 
this basic design. For example, one might name the hazards and vary 
those names, holding the hazard characteristics constant, to see 
whether the model people use to weight and combine the 
characteristics varies as a funct1on of the type of hazard being 
evaluated. 
·' < 
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One limitation of the analysis-of-variance approach is that it 
sometimes creates combinations of characteristics that may not exist 
in reality and, henc~, may be hard to judge. A second limitation is 
that it asks people to judge a rather abstract profile. A feature 
that the analysis of variance approach shares with the factor-
analytic approach is that the researcher forces the respondent to 
consider a set of well-defined characteristics when judgi~g each 
hazard. Thi's feature is a strength if the set spans the ·universe of 
important characteri$tics, a weakness if it does not. Similarity-
based techniques do not specify the characteristics for the 
respondents, and should be used to supplement the more structured 
methods. Another supplementary technique is the repertory grid, 
used to study hazards by Green and Brown (1980). Respondents were 
shown three hazards and were asked to indicate a characteristic that 
two of the hazards shared with each other but not with the third. 
An extens~ve set of characterisics was generated. by this method, 
including many not stu'died previously. The. repertory grid could be 
used as a starting point for factor-~nalytic or analysis of variance 
studies. 
The repertory grid· is one of a larger cla.ss of ".free-response" 
techniqi'.ies,. which allow respondents to generate their own response 
alternatives. Earle and Lindell (in press) have used such open-
,, 
ended survey questions to study public perceptions of hazardous 
industrial facilities. Althoug~·many of their results.replicate 
thoie from studies using structured response alternatives, they 
obtained some important new findings as well. One was that their-
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respondents exhibited no spontaneo~s concern for future gene.rations, 
in contrast to the concern shown in factor analytic studies that 
explicitly forced consideration of this variable. Other 
possibilities lie in the family of "process-tracing" techniques, 
which attempt to make explicit the detailed oper'ations people employ 
. 
when making a judgment or decision (Raaij, 1983; Svenson, 1979). 
These methods require people to "think aloud" or search for 
information as they make their judgments. In this way, the 
characteristics that people deem important can be "observed" without 
having first been primed by the .researcher. 
There is, obviously, no method for modeling cognitive processes 
that does riot have some disadvantage. The choice depends upon the 
particulars of the scientific or policy problem being addressed. In 
many cases, several techniques will have to be used in concert in 
order to get a comprehensive picture of risk perceptions. 
Elaborating Factor-Analytic Representations 
Within the factor-analytic paradigm, one important topic is to 
look further at the generality of the recurrent two-factor structure 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. To date, this structure has been found 
with heterogeneous sets of hazards, ~elected in a variety of ways. 
An open question, of both theoretical and practical significance, is 
whether the structure would also pertain to a set of hazards all 
falling within the same cat~gory. For example, one point in both 
figures represents the item "railroads." But all railroad accidents 
are not the same. They differ with regard to: 
·I 
I 
' 
·i 
• Type of accident 
collisions 
derailments 
fires or explosions 
• Cause of accident 
unknown 
mechanical failure 
operator error 
environmental problem (e.g., mudslide) 
. 
• Nature of consequences 
deaths 
injuries 
property damage 
· environment.al damage 
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If a diverse set of railroad mishaps were judged on the various 
'' ' 
risk characteristics, wot1ld the same two- or three-factor space 
emerge as was obtained across the broader domain of hazards? With 
whatever space emerged, could the social cost or seriousness of an 
accident .be predictable on the basis of where it falls within the 
factor sp~ce (as in Figure 5)? Such a possibility ~ould be 
extremely useful for setting safety standards or addressing such 
specific design questions as: What sort of safety systems, at what 
cost, should a company instalL on a rail line going through a long 
· .. mou~-------~J.tunnel? · How wo1uld different types of rail accidents, 
,causing about equal damage to people and the environment, be 
perceived? How costly would they be to the railroad company? The 
.) 
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same general .sorts of questions coul.d be raised about other· classes 
of hazards such as genetic engineering or space fl~ght. 
Educating risk perceptions 
Research to date has taken risk perception as a given fact of 
life that policy makers must anticipate, satisfy., and cope with. 
The results.of this research, however, suggest a number of 
possibilities for aiding people's intuitive perceptions. These 
possibilities should be pursued in the interests of increasing the 
applied potential of this work. 
If the two-factor'solution is interpreted as an indication of 
how people· naturally think about hazards, then it provides a 
framework for presenting them with the information they need to 
participate in risk-management decisions. Thus, they should feel a 
need for good information about how well a hazard is known to 
science and the extent of its·catastrophic potential. If people. 
examine accident reports for their signal value, then methods are 
needed to assess informatiyeness and communications techniques are 
needed to express it meaningfully. 
The multivariate character of risk that has emerged in 
psychometric ·studies suggests that there are many things to be 
considered when thinking about "risk" and many incommensurable 
factors to bear in mind when assess'ing the relative riskiness of 
different hazards. The need for some convenient s\.lmmary measure of 
risk seems apparent. The attempt to develop a general purpose index 
of risk was intended· 'to address that need. Although reliance on 
multiattribute utility theory ensured the conceptual soundness of 
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that effort, empirical research is needed to establish its 
practicality. Can people provide the,explicit judgments needed to 
create suc.h an index? If an index is created, can people absorb the 
information that it summarizes in a way that will be meaningful? 
Even if they endorse the index in principle, will they be willing to 
accept decisions based upon it? Would they feel more comfortable 
being shown, in matrix. form~ the information t·hat it summarizes, 
leaving them to perform the integration in their heads? 
An 'important theme in the psychometric literature·has been 
establishing why lay and expert perceptions of risk differ. As 
described earlier, one cause of these differences is in the 
definitions of risk that lay people and experts use. Once' these 
sources of disagreement have been clarified, one can examine the 
accuracy of lay perceptions regarding those aspects of risk that are 
of importance to them. In some cases,· lay people's disagreements 
wit'h experts can be defended (e.g.' on grounds of their having 
access to information that the experts lack, or their being more 
sensitive to the inconclusiveness in current scientific knowledge 
than those who produce it)~· When lay people's views cannot be 
. defended, it becomes important to provide·them with the information 
needed to make decisions in their own best interests (Fischhoff, in 
., 
press; ~lovic, . Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1980b). The foundation of 
knowledge laid by psychometric studies could serve as the 
springboard for research showing how best to communicate risk 
information and improve people's perceptions. 
'' 
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Conclusions 
Individual and societal response to hazards is obviously' 
,·multide
0
termined. Political, social, C~~~~S:, psylhologica'.l. and. 
technical factors interact in complex and as yet in~ompletely 
understood ways to produce this response. Neverthe[ess, research 
aimed at understanding how people think about risk lean play an 
~---- . ! . 
important role in{gu~gpolicy decisions. Psychometric techniques 
seem capable of highlighting the concerns of people at risk and 
forecasting reactions to hazards and their management. The 
.· I 
knowledge provided by these techniques may·prove essential to 
. . . . . . . I 
helping people cope with the risks they face in their daily lives 
and ensuri~g the success of risk-'m.anagement policiel at the societal 
level. 
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Table 1 
Ordering of Perceived Risk for 30 Activities and Technologies 
(The ordering is based on the geometric mean risk ratings within each group. 
Rank 1 represents the most risky activity or technology.) 
College .Active Club League of 
Women Voters Students Members experts 
Nuclear power 
Motor vehicles 
Handguns 
Smoking 
Motorcycles 
Alcoholic beverages 
General (private) aviation 
Police work 
Pesticides 
Surgery 
Fire fighting 
Large construction 
Hunting 
Spray cans 
Mountain climbing 
Bicycles 
Commercial aviation 
Electric power (non-nuclear) 
Swimming 
Contraceptives 
Skiing 
X rays 
High school & college football 
Railroads 
Food preservatives 
Food coloring 
Power mowers 
Prescription antibiotics 
Home appliances 
Vaccinations 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
5 
2 
3 
6 
7 
15 
8 
4 
11 
10 
14 
18 
13 
22 
24 
16 
19 
30 
9 
25 
17 
26 
23 
12 
20 
28 
21 
27 
29 
Source: Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichten~tein, 1981. 
8 
3 
1 
4 
2 
5 
11 
7 
15 
9 
6 
13 
10 
23 
12 
14 
18 
19 
17 
22 
16 
24 
21 
20 
28 
30 
25 
26 
27 
29 
20 
1 
4 
2 
6 
3 
12 
17 
8 
5 
18 
13 
23 
26 
29 
15 
16 
9 
10 
11 
30 
7 
27 
19 
14 
21 
28 
24 
22 
25 
Table 2 
Accident Scenarios Designed to Vary in Informativeness 
Low Information Value 
Bus skids on ice and runs 
off road (27 killed) 
Dam collapse (40 killed) 
Hundred year flood (2,700 killed) 
Meteorite hits stadium 
(4,000 killed) 
Two jumbo jets collide on 
runway (600 killed) 
High Information Value 
Nuclear reactor accident: Partial core 
meltdown releases radiation inside plant 
but not outside (1 killed) 
Botulism in well-known brand 
of food (2 killed) 
New model auto steering fails (3 killed) 
Recombinant DNA workers contract 
mysterious illness (10 killed) 
Jet engine falls off~n take off(300 killed) 
Source: Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1980b. 
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Table 3 
Correlates of Per~eived Risk 
Correlations within hazards 
Correlations 
Variable across 30 hazards Mean Nuclear Power Bicycles 
Voluntariness -.05 -.08 -.20 -.15 
Immediacy .09 .04 -.01 .08 
Known to exposed .24 .oo -.24 -.08 
Known to science .24 .01 .02 -.13 
Controllability -.07 -.09 -.14 .10 
Familiarity .05 -.09 -.01 .04 
Catastrophic Potential .30 .11 .32 .08 
Dread .68 .19 • 24 .07 
Severity .71 • 26 • 37 .16 
(consequences fatal) 
Desire for • 81 .43 .58 .48 
Risk Reduction 
Figure Captions 
1. Location of 30 hazards within the two-factor space obtained· 
from League of .Women Voters, student, Active Club, and expert 
groups. Connected lines join or enclose the loci of four group 
points for each hazard. Open circles represent data from the expert 
group. Unattached points represent groups that fall within the 
triangle created by the other three groups. Source: Slovic, 
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1981. 
2. Hazard locations on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the 
in,terrelationships among 18 risk characteristics. Each factor is 
made up of. a combination of characteristics, as indicated by the 
lower diagram. Source: Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, in pr·es~"(b. 
3. Tree representation of cau~es of death. Source: Johnson & · 
Tversky, in press. 
4. Attitudes towards regulation of the hazards in Figure 2. 
The larger the_point~ the greater.the desire for strict reg~lation 
to reduce risk. 
5. Relation between signal potential and risk characterization 
for 30 hazards in Figure 2. The larger the poi~t, the greater the 
degree to which an accident involving that hazard was judged to 
"ser,ve as a warning signal for society, providing new information 
about the probability that similar or even more destructive mishaps 
might occur within this type 9f activity." Source: Slavic, 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, in press. 
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MOWERS 
FACTOR 1: UNKNOWN RISK 
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HANDGUNS 
COMMERCIAL AVIATION 
Figure 1. Location of 30 hazards within the two-factor space obtained from 
League of Women Voters, student, Active Club and expert groups. Connected 
lines join or enclose the loci of four group points for each hazard. Open 
circles represent data from the expert group. Unattached points represent 
groups that fall within the triangle created by the other three groups. 
Source: Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1981. 
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Figure 2. Hazard locations on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the 
interrelationships among 18 risk characteristics. Each factor is made 
up of a combination of characteristics, as indicated by the lower 
diagram. Source: Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, in press..,-b. 
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Figure 3. Tree representation of causes of death. 
Source: Johnson & Tversky, in press. 
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Figure 4. Attitudes towards regulation of the hazards I I in Figure 2. The larger the point, the greater the I 
desire for strict regulation to reduce risk. 
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Figure 5. Relation between signal potential and risk 
characterization for 30 hazards in Figure 2. The larger the 
point, the greater the degree to which an accident involving .. 
that hazard was judged to "serve as a warning signal for 
society, providing new information about the probability that 
similar or even more destructive mishaps might occur within 
this type of activity." Source: Slavic, Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, in press. 
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